



**the national archives**

[www.nationalarchives.gov.uk](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk)

# Security in public spaces

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# Security?

*“Freedom from danger, **risk** etc”* – Dictionary.com (1 of 13)

	Google	TNA
Security	603,000,000	142,000
Public Safety	2,200,000	5,400

# Security at The National Archives

## Protection of Assets


- **People** – staff and visitors to our premises
- Buildings – all National Archives buildings
- Equipment – computers, furniture
- **Information** – corporate records, public records, data stored on IT systems

<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/security.pdf>

# Risks (1)

- Terrorist activity (as a government dept/national body)
- Criminal activity (abuse, theft, damage & even forgery)
- Accidental damage (poor handling, carelessness)
- Staffing (insufficient, inadequately trained)
- Environment (fire, power failures, flood, evacuation, environmental conditions)
- Loss or misplacement of records (incomplete catalogue entries)
- Rule breaking

# Risks (2) - Reputation



# Risk assessment

- Focus human efforts on high risk areas
  - Main entrance (bag searching, pass issuing etc)
  - Ingress/egress from Reading Rooms (in and out)
  - Point of presence and floor-walking in Reading Rooms
- Back up with appropriate systems and processes
  - Reader Registration (under review)
  - CCTV (being upgraded)
  - Tattle tapes (e.g. Library stock)
  - Rules (under review)

# Standards & guidelines

- H&S at Work Act 1974
- Public Records Act 1958/1967
- FOI Act 2000
- DPA 1998
- BS5454:2000 (storage & exhibition of archival documents)
- Cabinet office guidance
- Consultation and advice from relevant police and security bodies
- Inspections and audits

# Changes & challenges

- Public Records Act – requirement to safeguard/preserve records whilst also allowing access
- Changes in the wider environment post 9/11, 7/7 in terms of public attitude to safety – greater awareness of threats & more likely to challenge and/or be critical of measures and assert rights
- Greater awareness of statutory obligations such as the PRA/FOI – more likely to remind us of our obligations
- More pressure on public bodies to remain relevant and deliver services efficiently
- Threat changing
- More channels to communicate displeasure (social networking)

# Our Approach - *Appropriate & Proportionate*

## Appropriate

Measure according to the perceived level of risk & to our role as custodian of public records

## Proportionate

Measures which deal effectively with offenders but do not penalise the 99.99% of users who care about the records, respect our staff and adhere to our rules

# Kew 2008

- Open access to surrogates (microform & web) - *Relaxation*
  - Opens up access to the records (albeit in surrogate form)
  - Change of emphasis (security vs. preservation)
  - Encourages access to online resources
  - No Reader registration (FRC model)
  - Potential tensions - traditional researchers vs. family historians
  - Potential behavioural issues
- Restricted access to original documents - *Intensification*
  - Enhanced ID requirements for Reader registration
  - Enhanced CCTV/security presence
  - More floor-walking

# Consultation & Communication

- Security measures can both reassure & annoy the public
- Rules should be sensible, defensible and consistent
- Measures should be enforced politely but firmly
- Infringements should be consistently enforced, reassuring staff and users that security is taken seriously – zero tolerance on abuse of staff and damage to the records
- Regularly review and make changes, where appropriate
- Consult users when considering changes & listen to feedback
- Users are potential allies if engaged but can be vocal opponents when not!

# Questions?

